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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN IMAGERY 
ABILITY AND MENTAL SIZE COMPARISON 
By 
TAKAO HATAKEYAMA (~UJ*=~)1 
(Yamagata University) 
The present research examined how several imagery tests could predict the objective 
performance and the sUbjective estimates in the two mental size comparison tasks, i.e., object 
comparison and clock comparison. In both tasks, a clear "symbolic distance effect" (Moyer & 
Bayer, 1976) was revealed. Linear regression tests for the reaction time of individual subjects, 
however, was not related to the degree of the subjective estimates on imagery use, though that 
degree was related to the performance. The Betts QMI was predictive of the response speed in 
both tasks, namely, the subjects with high vivid imagery responded more quickly, especially at 
small size differences. The Space Relations predicted the faithfulness to the imagery instruction 
and the confidence of correctness. The Flags and the Gordon TVIC, in the clock task, was 
related to error responses, and the latter was in turn also to the estimates of imagery use 
frequency. When the QMI was combined with the Flags, the Space Relations and the TVIC, 
respectively, the high vivid-low control subjects responded quickly and the low vivid-high 
control subjects did slowly in the clock task, especially at small size differences. The MPFB, the 
VVIQ and the VVQ did not have any prominent predictive efficiency. Consideration was made 
on how individual subjects actually solved the tasks by means of their imagery ability. 
Key words: imagery ability, mental size comparison, individual differences, symbolic 
distance effect, Betts' Questionnair upon Mental Imagery. 
Though researches concerning imagery have been accumulated, few researches 
have been made on the individual differences in imagery process on cognitive tasks and 
in imagery ability, and very little is known about them. The author revealed some 
interesting findings in the study which examined how three spatial and three question-
naire tests, which are all widely used as imagery tests, could predict the performance 
on two sorts of mental rotation tasks, i.e., post-stimulus and pre-stimulus (preparatory) 
rotation tasks (Hatakeyama, 1981). It was found in this research that to investigate 
how imagery tests are related to well-investigated cognitive tasks, such as mental 
rotation, would be a good means to clarify not only what aspects of and how each test 
would predict the tasks, but how imagery would actually function and how differently 
each individual would use imagery. The present research examined how several 
imagery tests could predict the performance in mental size comparison tasks. 
Moyer (1973) showed the fact that the time needed for comparing the size of 
animal in memory was inversely related to the estimated difference in animal size. 
1. Section of Psychology, Faculty of Education, Yamagata University, Kojirakawa-machi, 
Yamagata, 990 Japan. 
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This "symbolic distance effect" (Moyer & Bayer, 1976) han been replicated not only for 
the size dimension (Holyoak, 1977; Holyoak, Dumais & Moyer, 1979; Jamieson & 
Petrusic, 1975; Kosslyn, Murphy, Bemesderfer & Feinstein, 1977; Paivio, 1975, 
1978 a) but for abstract dimensions such as intelligence (Banks & Flora, 1977), 
pleasantness and monetary value (Paivio, 1978 b). 
About the relation with imagery ability, Paivio (1978 a, b, c) already examined in 
the mental comparison tasks, i.e., comparison of mental clocks, shape comparisons, and 
comparison on pleasantness and on value, and revealed that the subjects with high 
imagery ability responded faster than low imagery ones. In Paivio, however, imagery 
ability was solely defined by the sum of standard scores of three spatial tests. As 
Kosslyn (1980) pointed out, the test approach to individual differences in imagery use 
would be useful if one had some priori reason for believing that given tests do in fact 
require imagery (p. 404). Each of the imagery tests, including self-report techniques, 
must be examined by the tasks which have been proved to reflect imagery processes. 
Particularly, we regret that Paivio abandoned the two questionnaire tests which he 
had administered as part of a battery, bacause we got interesting findings in relation 
to the mental rotation tasks by combining self-report vividness tests with self-report 
and objective controllability tests (Hatakeyama, 1981), and J. Richardson (1979) 
revealed by analyzing subjects' introspective reports that mental imagery was used in 
making mental comparisons among concrete objects in terms of both physical prop-
erties and abstract properties. 
The present research was made on two mental size comparison experiments; 
Experiment 1 on objects and Experiment 2 on clocks. In the former, imagery instruc-
tion was not given, as in Moyer (1973) and Paivio (1975, Experiment 1). In the latter, 
imagery instruction was given, as in Paivio (1978 a). By analyzing the relation of the 
experiments with imagery tests, we might clarify how each of the tests would predict 
the performance of the mental size comparison tasks and how individual subjects 
would actually solve the tasks by means of their imagery ability. Moreover, if any 
relation with imagery tests would appear, we might prove that imagery would function 
spontaneously when subjects compare object sizes and that it would be used volunta-
rily when they compare clocks. We got some subjective estimates made by the 
subjects themselves centering around on their imagery use. Of course we should not 
give an explanation to the phenomenon solely on the ground of their introspections, 
but we would use them supplementarily to understand subjects' solving processes. 
The estimation data on the imagery use frequency would be especially important if 
imaginary process would be indispensable in the tasks. The estimates on the correct-
ness of responses would be indices of subjects' confidence. 
This research was somewhat tentative and did not lead directly to some plain 
hypotheses. Some predictions would be shown below. 
(a) If imagery is not a mere accompanying phenomenon but has an substantial 
function, the vividness tests will have something to do with the tasks but the control-
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lability tests have nothing, since the subjects should be required to visualize images 
but not be required to transform them in the tasks. 
(b) The vividness tests will be related not only to objective indices of reaction 
time and errors but to subjective estimates on imagery use frequency, etc. 
(c) The combinations of vividness and controllability tests will not have sub-
stantial predictive efficiency. 
(d) Individual differences in imagery ability will playa more essential part in 
the clock task (Experiment 2) than in the object task (Experiment 1), since the former 
should be more difficult to solve without visualizing, unless the subjects will use a 
mathematical strategy. 
EXPERIMENT I 
The question was examined how the imagery tests predicted objective perform-
ance (reaction time and error) and subjective estimates (imagery use frequency and 
response correctness) in the mental size comparison task of objects. 
METHOD 
Subjects: One hundred and seven subjects (45 men and 62 women), all students 
at Yamagata University, were selected for the analysis. They participated in all the 
imagery tests and Experiment 1 and 2, and did not need extremely long reaction time 
and/or make too many error responses. 
Materials: 129 items, names of 88 common objects and 41 animals, were selected 
out of 158 items in Holyoak, Dumais & Moyer's (1979) Table 3 and out of 176 items in 
Paivio's (1975) Table 1, considering the familiarity to Japanese students. For the size 
scales of the former items, the mean ratings of Holyoak et al.'s were wholly used, 
because those norms were established more strictly than Paivio's, and for the latter 
items, the author, positioning them arbitrarily in the ordered list of Holyoak et al., 
gave expedient norms to them. Using these items, the author selected two lists of 40 
pairs so that each of the five size differences, namely, 0, 1,3,5 and 7, had eight pairs 
of items. The size differences were calculated by subtracting the size norm of one 
member from the size norm of the other. Any given item occurred only once in any 
list, and these two lists had 118 items in all. The items were expressed in daily 
Japanese, namely, in kanji (Chinese character), hiragana (the cursive kana character) 
or katakana (the square form of kana), and each word was expressed by using one to 
eight characters. The left-right positions of larger members of the pairs were counter-
balanced in each list, under the restriction that the same side would not be used for 
larger members more than three times, except the pairs of "0" size difference. The 
stimulus pairs were photocomposed horizontally in Gothic types on 20 X 20 cm white 
field, with 2 cm separating each item in the center. The height of the stimulus words 
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was 1.6 cm and the width was 1.3 to 8.7 cm, which approximately corresponded to the 
number of characters. 
Procedure: The stimuli were presented by means of a Takei DP-type three-field 
tachistoscope, and reaction times were recorded on a Takei Digitimer in msec. The 
timer started when the stimulus was illuminated and stopped when the subject pressed 
either left- or right-hand key. In the same instance, one of the two little red lamps 
lighted on, which told the experimenter which side key the subject pressed. Subjects 
were instructed to press the key on the side the member on which is thought larger one 
in real life for each pair of named objects. Each trial went on as follows: first there 
was a "ready" signal, and a pre-exposure field with a little black cross centered was 
presented for 2,000 msec, which was followed by the exposure of the stimulus pair. 
After the subject pressing the key, the experimenter reset the tachistoscope. The 
procedure was illustrated by showing an example of a pair of printed names. 6 
practice trials were given prior to the 40 experimental trials. After the experimental 
task, subjects were asked to give an introspection about their strategies they had used 
in the task, and asked to make two estimates in percent concerning how often they had 
used imagery and how correctly they had responded. 
Imagery Tests: Imagery ability was measured by four questionnaire and three 
spatial-manipulation tests. The former included Sheehan's modification of Betts' 
Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery (QMI) (A. Richardson, 1969), Gordon Test of 
Visual Imagery Control (TVIC) (A. Richardson, 1969), Marks' (1973) Vividness of 
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) and A. Richardson's (1977) Verbalizer-
Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ)2. The latter included the Flags (Thurstone & Jeffrey, 
1959), the Space Relations (a subtest of the Differential Aptitude Tests, Bennett, 
Seashore & Wesman, 1974) and the Revised Minnesota Paper Form Board Test 
(MPFB) (Likert & Quasha, 1970)3. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
For each subject, median and quartile deviation of reaction times were used for 
each of the five size differences as the measures of subject's reaction time (RT) and its 
dispersion (Q). The measure of error (Er) was the frequency of error responses for 
each size difference. 
(a) RTs, Qs and Ers, averaged over subjects, all were decreasing according to the 
size differences (Fig. 1). This demonstrates a typical "symbolic distance effect" 
(Moyer & Bayer, 1976), also with respect to the Q, i.e., the dispersion of reaction times 
within each subject. Fig. 1 shows that the symbolic distance effect diminishes 
markedly when the size norm differences are beyond "3" (e.g., penguin-ear) for both 
RT (including its Q) and Er, and Er disappears substantially beyond "5" (e.g., 
2. We used these questionnaire tests in Japanese versions, which were translated by the author. 
3. The time limits were shortened for the Space Relations and the MPFB 
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key-cow). 
Size Difference 
Subjects' individual estimates in percent 
on the frequency of imagery use ranged from 
o to 100% and their mean estimate was 68.7%. 
According to their introspection, many 
subjects reported that they could judge 
directly, i.e., without imagining, when the 
words were the names of extreme large or 
small objects (e.g., whale, flea), and that they 
visualized objects when the words were the 
names of similar sized objects. Therefore, we 
can say subjects believed that they used 
imagery in this mental comparison task. 
Fig. 1. Mean RT, Q and Er as a function of D'd h' b" .. 
I d · d'Jr . E . Il t elr su ]ectIve recognItion concern-sca e SIze luerence III xperlmen . 
ing imagery use have substantial function in 
performing the task? To examine this, we divided the estimates into three parts and 
classified the highest as high frequency (H), i.e., upper than 80%, and the lowest as low 
frequency groups (L), i.e., lower than 50%. A two-way analysis of variance, with 
repeated measure on the size difference variable, was made on RTs, Qs and Ers (Kirk's 
06 (1968) unweighted-mean solution for Type SPF-p.q Design). The H group showed 
a tendency to make less errors at small size differences (main effects, F (1,62)=3.31, 
.05<p <.10; interaction, F (3,186)=2.25, .05<p<.1OJ. A t-test revealed that the H 
group made higher estimates on the correctness than the L group (t (62) =2.67, p < 
.01J. It said that the subjects who reported more frequent imagery use had more 
confidence in the performance and made less errors than the subjects who reported less 
frequency. This might suggest that the subjective recognition concerning imagery use 
has a substantial relation to the performance in the mental size comparison task of 
objects. 
Moreover, to examine if the symbolic distance effect reflected subjective imagery 
use, we performed linear regression tests for reaction times of individual subjects and 
observed how the subjects with significant linear regression slopes at p < .05 were 
included in the groups mentioned above, but in this case, including the middle 
frequency group. Table 1 revealed no differences among the groups. Therefore, it 
can be said that the symbolic distance effect which appears in the mental object task 
does not reflect directly the subjective imagery use. 
(b) Sex difference was analyzed by performing a two-way analysis of variance on 
RTs, Qs and Ers, and it was analyzed by a t-test on imagery use and correct response 
estimates. Sex difference was found only on the estimates of correct responses, 
namely, men estimated more highly than women, means of 80.0 and 74.7%, respective-
ly (t( 105) = 2.26, P < .05J. Thus, women gave estimations modestly for some un-
known reason. 
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Table 1. Number of subjects with linear regression slopes 
for each frequency level of imagery use 
in Experiment 1 
Frequency Level Regression Non - Regression 
High (N=54) 49 ( 90.7%) 5 ( 9.3%) 
Middle (N=21) 21 (100.0 ) o ( 0.0 ) 
Low (N=32) 28 ( 87.5 ) 4 (12.5 ) 
Table 2. Correlations between imagery tests 
Flags Space MPFB TVIC QMI VVQ 
Space .24* 
MPFB .00 .22* 
TVIC .23* .14 .02 
QMI .07 .09 -.03 -.06 
VVIQ .02 -.05 -.03 -.26** .32** 
VVQ .03 -.02 -.02 .27** -.09 -.16 
*p<.05 **p < .01 
(c) The correlation coefficients between each of the tests were in Table 2. They 
showed low or no correlations. Therefore, these tests are all called and used as 
imagery tests, but they would measure different aspects of imagery, if they would do. 
The relation between imagery ability and performance was analyzed. First, the 
scores on each imagery test were divided into three parts, whose upper one third and 
lower one third were called high imagery (H) and low imagery groups (L), respectively. 
For the Betts QMI and the VVIQ, the upper 
was classified as L and the lower as H. Since 
the sex difference was found in the scores of 
the Flags and the MPFB, namely, men were 
superior than women in the former, and the 
reverse in the latter, classifications in terms of 
these tests were made within each sex. 
The RTs, Qs and Ers were analyzed by a 
two-way analysis of variance. For the QMI 
alone, the H group revealed a tendency to 
respond faster than the L group (Fig. 2) [F(l, 
71) = 3.63, .05 < p < .1OJ. Though interaction 
did not reach significance, there was a large 
discrepancy between the mean RTs of both 
groups at "0" size difference, as shown in Fig. 
2. The dispersion of the reaction times was 
also less in the H group [F(1,71)=5.78, p< 
u 
~ 1.5 
~ 
E 
f= 
1.0 
T 
0---0 High (N~36! 
~ LO\ .... (N=37) 
Size Difference 
Fig. 2. Mean RT and Q as a function of 
scaled size difference for the two imagery 
groups on the Betts QMI in Experiment 
1. 
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.05J. 
Estimates of the imagery use and of the correct responses were analyzed by a 
t-test. Here again, for the Betts QMI, the H group estimated more highly than the L 
group on imagery use frequency, means of 73.6 and 61.1%, respectively [t (71)=2.28, 
P < .05J. The QMI test is supposed to measure imagery vividness. Therefore, these 
two results say that the subjects who thought themselves to possess vivid imagery 
reported more imagery use and responded faster than the subjects who thought 
themselves to possess weak imagery. This finding suggests that imagery is actually 
used in the process of mental size comparison of objects, even if any imagery strategy 
instruction is not given. Here, we can make a claim that the vividness of imagery is 
a matter of entirely subjective phenomenon but has an important function in cognitive 
process. 
The VVIQ should be expected to have been related to the task in the same manner 
as the QMI, but it was not the case. 
Another interesting result was found for the Space Relations on the estimates of 
correct responses, namely, the H group gave a higher estimation than the L group 
[t(68) = 3.45, P < .005]. Though there was not any significant difference between both 
groups in the actual performance, the H group seemed to have possessed higher 
confidence in performance than the L group. This test can measure, according to the 
manual, both "the ability to visualize a constructed object from a picture of a pattern" 
and "the ability to imagine how an object would appear if rotated in various ways." 
The higher confidence of the H group in the present task will be discussed later. 
(d) The relation between vividness and controllability of imagery was analyzed. 
The scores on each test were divided at the median into high vivid or high control (H) 
and low vivid or low control groups (L). Each vividness test, i.e., the Betts QMI and 
the VVIQ, was combined with each controllability test, i.e., the Flags, the Space 
Relations, the MPFB and the Gordon TVIC, and for each combination we had high 
vivid-high control (H-H), high vivid-low control (H-L), low vivid-high control (L-H) 
and low vivid-low control groups (L-L). There was not any prominent difference 
among the groups in each combination. Considering this together with the fact that 
any controllability test was independently unrelated to the performance, it seems that 
the present mental size comparison task does not require any imagery controllability. 
EXPERIMENT II 
The question was examined how the imagery tests predicted objective perform-
ance (reaction time and error) and subjective estimates (faithfulness to the imagery 
instruction, clearness of images, imagery use frequency and response correctness) in the 
mental size comparison task of clocks. The two estimations were added in the present 
task in accordance with the imagery strategy instruction. 
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METHOD 
Subjects: The same one hundred and seven subjects as in Experiment 1 were also 
used for the analysis in the present experiment. 
Materials: In accordance with Paivio's (1978a) Experiment 1, two 40-pair lists 
of numerical times were formed so that each of the five angular size differences, namely, 
30°, 60°, 90°, 120° and 150°, had eight pairs of numerical times. The angular differences 
were calculated by subtracting the angular separation between the hour and minute 
hands of one time from the angular separation of the other. Discrepancies from Paivio 
(1978a) were found in the following two points. First, when selecting pairs of times, 
their mutual positions in the clock face were not considered in our experiment. 
Second, none of the times were repeated in each of our lists. 
The left-right positions of larger members of the pair were counterbalanced in each 
list, under the restriction that the same side would not be used in succession for larger 
members more than three times. The stimulus pairs of times were printed horizontally 
in Gothic face capitals on 20 X 20 cm white field, with 3.5 cm separating each item in 
the center. The height of the stimulus was 1.3 cm and the width of each stimulus time 
was 3.5 to 4.2 cm. 
Procedure: After Experiment 1, subjects participated in the present experiment. 
The general procedure was same as in Experiment 1. Subjects were instructed to press 
the key on the side of the larger member in a given pair of times, by imagining a pair 
of clock faces and comparing the angles formed by the clocks' hands. The procedure 
was illustrated by showing an example of a pair of printed times with the correspond-
ing clock faces and hands drawn under. They were then given 6 practice trials prior 
to the 40 experimental pairs. After the experimental task, subjects were asked, in the 
first place, to make two ratings on 7-point scale concerning two questions, "Did you 
follow the experimenter's instruction when you compared the angles ?" and "Did you 
imagine clock faces clearly?" The number 1 and 7 of the scales corresponded to the 
descriptions of "never" and "very well," respectively. Then they were asked to make 
another two estimates in percent concerning how often they had used imagery and how 
correctly they had responded. Lastly, they were asked concerning another specific 
devices, if any. 
Imagery Tests: The same scores of the same tests as those in Experiment 1 were 
used. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The same analyses were made as in Experiment 1. 
(a) Mean RTs, Qs and Ers all decreased with the increase of angular size 
difference (Fig. 3), which revealed a clear symbolic distance effect, as in Experiment 1 
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and as Paivio (197Sa). In the present task, 
an imagery instruction was given to the sub-
jects in advance. Subjects' estimates on 
their faithfulness to the instruction ranged 
from 2 to 7 in 7-point scale and the mean was 
4.7. Their estimates on the frequency of 
imagery use ranged from 10 to 100% and the 
mean was 65.3%. For the clearness of their 
images, they gave a mean estimate of 3.7. 
Therefore, on the average, they performed the 
task more or less faithfully to the instruction 
and imagined clock faces in about two third 
trials, but the clock faces were subjectively 
not so very clear. According to their intro-
spection, they could distinguish the difference 
of the size without imagining clock faces 
Fig. 3. Mean RT, Q and Er as a function of when numerical time was known to have 
angular size difference in Experiment 2. extremely large or small angle or when it was 
accustomed for the subjects for some reasons. 
Mathematical strategies were reported by 17 subjects (15.7%), as far as we did not take 
the degree of the frequency into consideration. On the whole, subjective estimates 
and reports tell us that the imagery use is occurred in performing the mental clock task. 
A two-way analysis of variance was made for the estimation on imagery use 
frequency. The high frequency subjects (H), i.e., upper than SO%, made responses 
more slowly and made less error responses than the low frequency subjects (L), i.e., 
lower than 50% CF(1,72)=3.22, .05<p<.1O; F(1,72)=4.S7, p<.05]. 
A t-test revealed that the H group made higher estimates than the L group on the 
faithfulness to the instruction Ct(72) = 7.29, P < .001J, on the clearness of imagined 
clock faces Ct(72)=4.75, p<.OOlJ and on the correctness Ct(72)=4.17, p<.OOl]. It 
might be that the subjects who reported more frequent use of imagery performed the 
task more faithfully to the imagery instruction, imagined more clearly and had more 
confidence in the performance. And they, interestingly, took longer time to respond, 
and made less errors. It may be said that the subjects who reported less frequent 
imagery use responded after an insufficient comparison and made more errors. The 
subjective recognition concerning imagery use has a substantial relation to the per-
formance in the mental size comparison task of clocks. 
We observed how the subjects with significant linear regression slopes at p < .05 
were included in the three groups, which were classified by the degree of imagery 
frequency estimation. Table 3 revealed no differences among the groups. Here 
again, we can propose that the symbolic distance effect which appeares in the mental 
clock task does not necessarily reflect the subjective use of imagery. 
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Table 3. Number of subjects with linear regression slopes 
for each frequency level of imagery use 
in Experiment 2 
Frequency Level Regression Non -Regression 
High (N=38) 25 (65.8%) 13 (34.2%) 
Middle (N=33) 25 (75.8 ) 8 (24.2 ) 
Low (N=36) 27 (75.0 ) 9 (25.0 ) 
(b) Sex difference was found in the subjective estimates on correctness and on 
clearness of imagined clocks, namely, men were higher than women [t(105)=4.97, p< 
.001; t(105)=2.16, p<.05J. In the actual performance, significant interaction was 
found on Ers, namely, men showed more error responses at smaller angular differences 
and less at larger angular differences than women [F(4,420)=2.16, .05<p<.10J. The 
difference of the estimates of correctness between both sexes became larger in this task 
when compared with Experiment 1. This might be attributed to the fact that women 
imagined clock faces which were less clear subjectively and they made more errors at 
the small angular differences, though their estimates concerning the performance had 
a tendency to be moderate. 
(c) For the Betts QMI, the H group responded faster than the L group, especially 
at small angular differences (Fig. 4) [main effects, F(1,71)=3.29, .05<p<.1O; inter-
action, F (4,284) = 5.16, P < .01 J. The dispersion of the reaction time was less in the H 
group as well [F(1,71)=3.1O, .05<p<.lOJ. 
However, very interestingly, there were no 
differences both on the estimates of imagery 
use and of the clearness of imagined clocks. 
No difference on the former might be caused 
by the fact that an imagery strategy instruc-
tion was explicitly given in advance. About 
the latter, we could expect higher estimates 
for the H group, because they are supposed to 
possess more vivid imagery. But that was 
not the case. It might be that the task did 
not need high degree but some degree of 
clearness of imagery clock faces that made it 
possible for the subject to judge the 
difference. Considering the results alto-
gether, it might be said that one of the factors 
underlying individual differences in imagery 
vividness is the difference in the speed with 
which the image can be produced in some 
degree of clearness that makes it possible to 
5.0 
4.5 
E 
~ 
" 4.0 
o 
l 
3.5 
3.0 
T 
30' 60' 
o---.-<l High (N = 36) 
__ Low (N=37) 
9~' 120' 150' 
Angular Difference 
Fig. 4. Mean RT and Q as a function of 
angular size difference for the two image-
ry groups on the Betts QMI in Experi-
ment 2. 
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be used. 
The VVIQ did not relate to the present task, too. 
For the Space Relations, a significant effect on the estimation of correctness was 
revealed, as was in Experiment 1 (t(68) =2.05, p<.05J. Also on the faithfulness and 
the imagery clock clearness, the H group made higher estimates than the L group 
(t(68)=2.08, p<.05; t(68)=1.78, .05<p<.IO]. However, again, there were no 
significant effects in the performance. This test was already proved to predict the 
preparatory mental rotation, i.e., the subjects who got high scores on the test performed 
the rotation in a manner faithful to the instruction and made a template match well 
(Hatakeyama, 1981). The facts are very interesting that the H group had higher 
confidence on performance in both of the object and the clock comparison tasks, and 
had higher faithfulness to the imagery strategy instructions in the clock task and in the 
preparatory mental rotation task (the latter required subjects to rotate an image in the 
abscence of stimulus). In sum, the H group classified by the Space Relations obeyed 
the imagery instruction well, imagined more clearly, and had more confidence in the 
performance. The reason why this test was not related to the actual performance 
would be that the size comparison tasks in this article did not require subjects to 
transform images. 
For the Flags, the H group made less error responses than the L group (F(I,69) = 
5.42, P < .05]. Moreover, the H group gave somewhat higher estimates on the clearness 
of imagery clocks than the L group (t(69)= 1.96, .05<p <.IOJ. This test is, according 
to the test manual, a measure of "the ability to visualize a rigid configuration when it 
is moved into different positions." Through the examination of the test with reference 
to mental rotation tasks (Hatakeyama, 1981), this test was confirmed that the measure-
ment of an orientation ability was made, i.e., an ability to identify fast and accurately 
the top of the rotatedly-presented stimulus. In the mental clock task, it is probably 
required to orientate accurately the directions or positions of the clock hands in the 
mind. It might be considered that the H group classified by the Flags was able to 
perform it well. 
For the Gordon TVIC, the H group made less errors than the L group (F (1,66) = 
2.80, .05 < p < .IOJ, made higher estimates on the faithfulness to the instruction 
(t(66) = 1.68, .05<p <.IOJ, and on the imagery frequency (t(66)=2.41, p< .05J. It is 
generally supposed that this questionnaire test measures the controllability of imagery, 
i.e., the ability to imagine a series of varied scenes in turn according to the descriptions. 
In the clock task, if they perform faithfully to the instruction, subjects have to 
visualize two clock faces with hour and minute hands in turn, which might have some 
common requirement with the Gordon test. It must be an important finding that the 
H group classified by this subjective test could, from their point of view, obey more 
faithfully to the imagery instruction and imagined clock faces more frequently, and 
made actually less error responses in performance. 
(d) For all combinations of the Betts QMI with four controllability tests, 
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significant interactions were revealed on RTs [QMI-Flags, F( 12,408) = 1.87, P < .05 ; 
QMI-Space Relations, F(12,404) =2.64, p<.Ol; QMI-MPFB, F(12,408) =2.46, p< 
.01; QMI-TVIC, F(12,408) =2.34, p<.OlJ, They all reflected the interaction which 
appeared between the H and the L groups for the QMI, that is, the vivid imagery group 
responded more quickly than the weak imagery group, especially at smaller size 
differences. The H-L groups in common 
responded most quickly and the L-H groups 
most slowly for the all combinations except 
the QMI-MPFB, but the L-L group respond-
ed as slowly as the L-H group for the QMI-
Flags (Fig. 5). 
How can we explain this? We found 
that the H-L groups in common made the 
lowest mean estimates on all the four subjec-
tive measures, namely, faithfullness to the 
imagery instruction, clearness of the 
imagined clocks, imagery use frequency and 
confidence of correctness, and the L-H groups 
made the highest or second highest estimates, 
though a one-way analysis of variance 
revealed only a few significant differences, 
namely, for QMI-Flags on clearness [F(3, 
102)=2.41, .05<p<.lOJ and on frequency 
[F(3,102) =2.76, p<.05J, and for QMI-Space 
Relations on clearness [F(3,101)=2.20, .05< 
P < .1OJ and on confidence [F(3,101) = 2.28, 
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Fig. 5. Mean RT as a function of angular 
size difference for the four imagery 
groups on the Betts QMI-Flags in Exper-
iment 2. 
.05<p<.1OJ, On the total error responses, the H-L groups were commonly the most 
and the L-H groups were the least for the QMI-Flags and the QMI-TVIC, but both 
groups were not so for the QMI-Space Relations, though only one significant effect was 
revealed statistically, i.e., for the QMI-Flags [F(3,102)=2.19, .05<p<.lOJ. It might 
be that the subjects who can visualize images vividly but cannot control them (in their 
respective senses of the tests) respond quickly to the mental size comparison task 
without recognizing the imagery process, and that the subjects who cannot visualize 
images vividly but can control them respond slowly and recognize the imagery process. 
For the QMI-MPFB, the most quick reaction time was taken by the H-H group 
and the most slow one was by the L-L group. But that is not discussed here, since we 
could not find any relation of the MPFB itself to the task. 
CONCLUSION 
The present research examined how several Imagery tests could predict the 
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performance in two mental size comparison tasks, i.e., object comparison and clock 
comparison. The principal findings are as follows. 
(a) In both tasks, a clear "symbolic distance effect" was revealed on reaction 
time, its dispersion and error responses, namely, they all decreased with the increase of 
size differences between the items. 
(b) This effect, however, did not reflect the degree of subjective estimates on 
imagery use in both tasks. Probably the symbolic distance effect itself does not 
necessarily mean the imagery use in mental size comparison task. 
(c) Subjects used imagery from their subjective point of view, since they gave 
mean estimates of about two thirds on the imagery use frequency in both tasks. 
According to the introspection, they judged directly without imagining when an item 
was known to have extremely large or small size or when it had been quite familiar to 
them for some reasons. 
(d) The high estimators on imagery frequency responded more slowly in the 
clock task and made less errors in both tasks. Moreover, they gave higher estimates 
on all subjective measures than the low estimators. The subjective recognition 
concerning imagery use has a substantial relation to the performance in the mental size 
comparison task. 
(e) In the clock task, men made a little more error responses at smaller angular 
differences and less at larger ones than women. Moreover, women estimated more 
moderately than men on the correctness in both tasks and on the clearness of images 
in the clock task. 
(f) The Betts QMI was predictive of the response speed in both tasks, namely, 
the subjects with high vivid imagery responded more quickly, especially at small size 
differences. This finding suggests that imagery has an substantial function. Interest-
ingly, the high vivid imagers estimated more highly than the low vivid imagers on 
imagery use frequency in the object task in which no imagery instruction had been 
given, but did not do so on the imagery use and also on the clearness of images in the 
clock task in which imagery instruction had been given. These findings might give a 
hypothesis that one of the factors underlying individual differences in imagery 
vividness can be due to the differences in the speed with which the image can be 
produced in some degree of clearness that makes it possible to be used. 
(g) In both tasks, the subjects who got high scores on the Space Relations gave 
higher estimates on the correctness of their responses than the subjects who got low 
scores. In addition, in the clock task, they made higher estimates on the faithfulness 
to the imagery instruction. However, there were not any significant differences 
between the two groups in the actual performance. This test might predict the 
faithfulness to the imagery instruction and confidence in the performance. 
(h) In the clock task, the subjects who got high scores on the Flags made less 
error responses. It might be said that this test predicted the ability to orientate 
accurately the directions or positions of the clock hands in the task. 
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(i) In the clock task, the subjects who estimated themselves as good at control-
ling visual images on the Gordon TVIC made higher estimates on the frequency of 
imagery use and made less errors in the performance. It might be that this question-
naire test predicted the manner of visualizing two clock faces one by one. 
(j) In the clock task, for the QMI -Flags, for the QMI -Space Relations, and for the 
QMI-TVIC, the high vivid-low control subjects (in the respective senses of the tests) 
responded most quickly and the low vivid-high control subjects most slowly. It 
might be that, considering the subjective estimation data, the former subjects respond-
ed quickly to the task without recognizing the imagery process, and that the latter 
subjects responded slowly and recognized the imagery process. 
(k) The MPFB, the VVIQ and the VVQ did not have any prominent predictive 
efficiency both in the objective performance and on the subjective estimates. The 
VVIQ should be expected to have predicted the tasks in the same manner as the Betts 
QMI, but it was not the case for some reason. 
(1) The correlation coefficients between imagery tests showed low or no correla-
tions with each other. Moreover, the predictive efficiency of each test in the two sorts 
of mental size comparison tasks were different from each other. Therefore, these tests 
would measure different aspects of imagery, if they would do, though they are all 
called and used as imagery tests. 
(m) Individual differences in imagery ability played a more essential part in the 
clock task than in the object task, on the basis of predictive efficiency of the imagery 
tests. 
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